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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICHARD F. McKEAN, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellee ) 
vs. ) 
MICHAEL W. McBRIDE, ALPINE LTD., ) Case No. 920705-CA 
and FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE ) 
INSURANCE CO., GEODYNE II, a Utah ) 
general partnership, DAN C. SIMONS, and ) 
ARDEN J. BODELL, ) District Court No. C85-4003 
Defendants/Appellants ) (Priority No. 16) 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
RESPONSE TO McKEAN'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants/defendants ("defendants") respond to McKean's Statement of Facts in 
his brief as follows. The paragraphs numbers below correspond with the paragraphs of the 
same number in McKean's brief. 
11. As argued below, the lower court's finding (Finding of Fact No. 29) that the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract1 was nothing more than an "option" granted to Child to 
purchase the interests of Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen is a conclusion of law and not a 
finding of fact. That conclusion was inconsistent with the plain language of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract and with the subsequent treatment of the Contract by the Bankruptcy Court. 
1
 A copy of the Uniform Real Estate Contract (Exhibit D-9) was attached to defendants' 
opening brief as Addendum E. 
-1-
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The fact that Child filed bankruptcy before his first payment was due does not diminish the 
validity of the Contract.2 
13. McKean asserts that the Bankruptcy Court "ordered the bankruptcy trustee to 
sell the Traverse Mountain property free and clear of all liens at auction to the highest 
bidder." (McKean Brief, at 8.) The sale occurred on February 28, 1985. Defendants do not 
dispute this factual assertion so long as it is clear that Child's bankruptcy trustee had 
possession of and sold the entire Traverse Mountain property, not merely Child's ore-fifth 
interest in the property under the Real Estate Sales Agreement dated June 1, 1978 une 
"Alpine Contract"). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The question whether the appeal is moot was never decided by the lower 
court and is presently pending as an issue in an undecided district con, action. Even on the 
merits, the appeal is not moot, since the validity of Ralph R. Tate's attorneys' lien and his 
right to execute on the collateral pledged in lieu of a supersedeas bond depends on the 
outcome of this appeal. So also does the right of Delaware Funding & Guaranty to retain any 
payments made by defendants. 
2. McKean has no direct claim in his own right. He did not raise that issue 
below and cannot do so for the first time on appeal. Even on the merits, McKean had no 
privity of contract with any of defendants. He paid the annual installment payment for 1979 
2
 As argued below, the Court's "finding" also ignores the unambiguous language 
contained in Child's Third Amended Plan of Reorganization (the "Plan") that the interests of 
New Empire Development, Cook, Hansen, and Lamoreaux were assigned to Child by an 
"unrecorded Real Estate Contract dated September, 1980." (Exhibit D-32, at 4.) Cook, 
Lamoreaux, and Hansen voted in favor of the Plan (Exhibit D-60; Tr. Vol. I, at 213-14; Vol. 
II, at 244-46), which was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court. (Exhibit D-32.) 
-2-
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solely on behalf of the buyers. If he has any claim at all, it is only because he received a 
written assignment of such claims in the 1985 assignment from Child, Cook, Lamoreaux, and 
Hansen. 
3. Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen sold their interests in the Alpine Contract to 
Myron Child, who thereafter claimed it as his own in his bankruptcy proceeding. His Third 
Amended Plan of Reorganization, confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court, provided that he had 
purchased the property from Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen and that they were secured 
creditors of Child's with liens on the property. Under the doctrine of equitable conversion, 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract was sufficient to pass title to Child, even though he did not 
make the payment required by the agreement. 
4. The failure of the Third Amended Plan of Reorganization did not reinstate 
ownership of Traverse Mountain in Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen. Nor did it affect the 
forfeiture of claims that they had under paragraph 2.6 of the Alpine Contract. The Third 
Amended Plan of Reorganization specifically provided, in Article XVI that if the Plan failed 
Child would "automatically forfeit" any right that he would otherwise have to require a 
conveyance of property under paragraph 2.6. 
5. The post-confirmation dismissal of Child's bankruptcy did not affect the 
validity of the Plan. Under bankruptcy law, the Plan continues to be viable. The sale of the 
property by Child's trustee and the forfeiture of claims under paragraph 2.6 of the Alpine 
Contract survived the dismissal. 
6. McKean's claim for a return of the money paid in 1979 is governed by a 
four year statute of limitations. His claims against defendants were not tolled by the filing of 
-3-
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Child's bankruptcy. He did not file his complaint within four years amd his claims are thus 
time-barred. 
7. McKean's claims are subject to a set-off, since his assignors owed Alpine the 
total purchase price of the Traverse Mountain property at the time they assigned their claims 
to McKean. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS APPEAL IS NOT MOOT. 
A. This Court previously denied McKean's motion to dismiss this 
appeal on the ground that it is moot. 
McKean previously raised the issue that the appeal is moot in a motion to dismiss 
the appeal filed on or about January 14, 1993. This Court initially responded to that motion 
by ordering a remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in the 
motion. (Order of Court of Appeals dated February 16, 1993.) On remand, the district court 
issued an Order dated May 5, 1993, ordering that McKean and his counsel, Ralph R. Tate, 
should file a separate equitable action to determine the issues relating to the validity of Tate's 
attorneys' lien and to determine the validity of the satisfaction of judgment. (Order, at 6; R. 
1804.)3 McKean's counsel, Ralph R. Tate, thereafter commenced an action in the Third 
3
 Relying on Midvale Motors, Inc. v. Saunders, 21 Utah 2d 181, 442 P.2d 938, 941 
(1968) ("the better rule, in the absence of special circumstances requiring a contrary holding 
to prevent injustice, is to require counsel to bring a separate action against his client to 
determine the amount of his fee and to foreclose his charging lien if any he has"), the lower 
court in the present case held that "the preferred procedure would be to have a separate 
equitable action filed where all issues may be raised and all entities who may have a 
responsibility for the payment of the attorney's fees of the filing of the satisfaction of 
judgment may be named as parties to the proceeding." (Order, dated May 5, 1993, at 6; R. 
1804.) 
-4-
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District Court4 in his own name to determine the validity of his attorneys' lien and the 
validity of the satisfaction of judgment. No trial has yet been held in that action. 
After the entry of the trial court's Order of May 5, 1993 (R. 1799-1805), this 
Court entered an order denying McKean's motion to dismiss the appeal. (Order dated August 
23, 1993.) Having denied the motion to dismiss, this Court need not revisit the issue of 
mootness. This is particularly the case since the issue of the validity of Tate's attorneys' lien 
and of the filing of the satisfaction of judgment are issues presently pending in the lower 
court in the separate equitable action commenced by Tate. 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider a matter that has not been ruled on by the 
lower court. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is defined by statute as "appellate" 
jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (1992). It does not have jurisdiction over issues 
not previously raised in the district court. DeBrv v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Appeals, 764 
P.2d 627 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).5 Since the lower court has yet to rule on the issues raised by 
Tate regarding the effect of the Agreement between Delaware Funding & Guaranty and 
defendants, this Court has no jurisdiction to determine whether the appeal in the present case 
is moot. 
4
 Tate's new action is entitled Ralph R. Tate, Jr. vs. Richard A. Christenson, Franklin 
Financial, Delaware Funding and Guaranty, TR Investments, Richard F. McKean, Merlyn 
Hanks, Geodyne II, a Utah partnership, Alpine Ltd., Dan C. Simons, Arden J. Bodel, Micheal 
W. McBride, and John Does 1-10, Civil No. 930902810. 
5
 See 5 C.J.S. § 1453 at 576 (1958) (a court, "in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction 
is limited to a review of the actual proceedings of the lower court, and can consider no 
original matter not connected with those proceedings and acted upon below"). 
-5-
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B. This appeal is not moot. 
McKean asserts that the appeal is moot because the judgment from which the 
appeal was taken has been satisfied pursuant to an agreement between Delaware Funding & 
Guaranty and defendants.6 He asserts that, "[b]ecause the judgment is satisfied, this appeal is 
moot except for court determination of the extent to which plaintiffs attorneys' lien attaches 
to the property pledged in lieu of a supersedeas bond." (McKean Brief, at 20; emphasis 
added.) By his own admission, McKean acknowledges that the validity of his counsel's lien 
as against defendants' property is dependent on the outcome of this appeal. If the judgment is 
reversed, there is no attorneys' lien that could attach to the property pledged by defendants' in 
lieu of a supersedeas bond. On the other hand, if the judgment is affirmed, McKean's 
counsel will undoubtedly seek to execute against the property pledged in lieu of a supersedeas 
bond. Defendants are entitled to have this appeal heard and decided so that it can be 
determined whether McKean's lawyer has any right to seek to enforce his claimed lien against 
defendants' property. 
Moreover, even under the Agreement and Assignment between Delaware Funding 
& Guaranty and defendants the appeal is not moot. Although Delaware Funding & Guaranty 
filed a Satisfaction of Judgment, the parties agreed that the appeal should be pursued. Under 
that agreement, defendants agreed to pay Delaware Funding a certain amount, subject to the 
outcome of the appeal. Paragraph 6 of the Agreement and Assignment provides: 
The parties do not intend that the appeal of the McKean Judgment, 
presently pending in the Utah Court of Appeals, should be dismissed or 
6
 That agreement was put before this Court as an attachment to the Affidavit of Merlyn 
Hanks, filed on or about January 27, 1993. A copy is appended to this Reply Brief for the 
Court's convenience. 
-6-
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otherwise affected by the execution of this Agreement and Assignment 
or the carrying out of its terms including the filing of the satisfaction of 
the McKean Judgment. The parties agree that the appeal shall be 
prosecuted until a final disposition is reached. In the event that the 
McKean Judgment is reversed or overturned, Delaware shall, within 
thirty (30) days repay any and all consideration that it may have 
previously received from Alpine, Geodyne II, Simons, or Bodell 
pursuant to this Agreement and Assignment. 
Thus, if the judgment is reversed, Delaware Funding shall be required to repay to 
defendants the consideration that they had paid under the agreement. The outcome of this 
appeal will have a very real effect on the obligations between Delaware Funding and 
defendants. It is not moot. 
II. 
McKEAN HAS NO DIRECT CLAIM AGAINST 
DEFENDANTS IN HIS OWN RIGHT. 
A. McKean cannot argue that he has a claim in his own right for the 
first time on appeal. 
In his brief, McKean argues, for the first time, that he has a claim as of right on 
his own behalf in addition to whatever rights were assigned to him by New Empire 
Development, Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen (collectively the "New Empire Group"). 
(McKean Brief, at 20-21.) McKean did not sue in his own right, however, but alleged in his 
Complaint only that he had received an assignment of claims from the New Empire Group 
and that he entitled to judgment based on the breach of the Alpine Contract. (Complaint, fflf 
8-13.) He did not raise this claim at trial and cannot do so on appeal for the first time. 
Mascaro v. Davis. 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987); Shine Dev. v. Frontier Invs.. 799 P.2d 221 
(Utah App. 1990). 
088\44336 1 
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B. McKean does not have a claim against defendants in his own right 
Even if this Court considers the merits of this assertion, it must fail. The trial 
court made no finding that McKean had "an equitable interest in the property" in the amount 
of his payment to Alpine, as he asserts on appeal. (McKean Brief, at 20.) Neither did the 
trial court find that "McKean had an actual and equitable cause of action against Alpine Ltd. 
to require delivery of the land." (McKean Brief, at 20.) The trial court held that Alpine had 
breached the Alpine Contract (Conclusions of Law No. 2; R. 681) and that McKean had a 
claim against defendants by virtue of his having received an assignment from the New Empire 
Group. (Findings of Fact Nos. 21, 22; Conclusion of Law No. 6; R. 676, 682.) McKean was 
not a party to the Alpine Contract, on which he filed suit, neither did he have any contract 
with Alpine or McBride. Without a written contract, his claim is barred by the Statute of 
Frauds. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1989). As noted above, McKean's Complaint alleges, not 
that he had a direct right, but only that he had an assignment of claims from the New Empire 
Group. McKean cites no legal authority for his claim to an "equitable interest" in the 
property. 
When McKean paid the $330,000 to Alpine and McBride, he did so on behalf of 
the New Empire Group.7 The money constituted the annual installment payment due under 
the Alpine Contract (Finding of Fact No. 13; R. 674), a contract to which McKean was not a 
7
 At trial, McKean testified that he paid the $330,000 "on behalf of the Buyers" and that 
he had "no direct contact [should be "contract"] with McBride or with Alpine." (Tr. Vol. I., 
at 70.) He and the New Empire Group agreed that the payment needed to be made "in order 
to keep that contract [the Alpine Contract] alive, which was $33,000." (Tr. Vol. I, at 40.) 
-8-
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party. The only contract that McKean had was an Earnest Money Agreement and Offer to 
Purchase with the New Empire Group. (Exhibit 3-P; Finding of Fact No. 12.)8 
In his brief, McKean asserts (for the first time) that when he was unable to recover 
the land he "was entitled to the return of his money." (McKean Brief, at 20.) He provides no 
authority or legal analysis whatsoever to support this contention. He does not explain why 
defendants are liable to him if they had no contract with him and if his payment of $330,000, 
tendered as the annual installment payment due under the Alpine Contract, was made "on 
behalf of the New Empire Group, who were the buyers under that Contract. (Tr. Vol. I., at 
70.) 
McKean asserts that his personal entitlement to a return of the money from 
defendants "was based on the written agreements between Alpine and the New Empire Group 
and between McKean and the New Empire Group and also upon the party performance by 
McKean by his delivery of the $330,000 to Alpine's agent." (McKean Brief, at 20.) He fails, 
however, to identify any contractual provision in the "written agreements between Alpine and 
the New Empire Group" that obligated the New Empire Group to repay the money to 
McKean in the event that property was not released under paragraph 2.6 of the Alpine 
Contract. There is no such provision in the Alpine Contract. Even if the Alpine Contract 
provided that the Buyers under that agreement would be entitled to a repayment (which it 
does not), that provision would not give McKean a direct claim against defendants. 
Even the Earnest Money Agreement contained no provision requiring the New Empire 
Group to repay to McKean his $330,000. Nor was there any other signed agreement under 
which the New Empire Group was obligated to repay McKean's money, as McKean 
acknowledged at trial. (Tr. Vol. I, at 75-76.). 
-9-
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McKean's claim that he has a direct claim for repayment of the $330,000 based on 
"the written agreements . . . between McKean and the New Empire Group" (McKean Brief, at 
20) is similarly insupportable. As McKean acknowledged at trial, there is no provision in the 
Earnest Money Agreement requiring repayment of his $330,000 by the New Empire Group, 
let alone Alpine. (Tr. Vol. I, at 75-76.) In any event, defendants are not bound by the 
agreement between McKean and the New Empire Group. 
If McKean has any claim at all against defendants it can only be as a result of the 
Assignment given to him by the New Empire Group on June 12, 1985. As shown below, that 
Assignment conveyed no right or claim to McKean that had not already been discharged or 
waived as a result of Myron Child's bankruptcy. Consequently, when the New Empire Group 
gave McKean the assignment there were no claims for them to assign. 
III. 
COOK, LAMOREAUX, HANSEN, AND NEW EMPIRE 
DEVELOPMENT SOLD THEIR INTEREST IN THE ALPINE 
CONTRACT TO MYRON CHILD IN 1980 AND THUS HAD 
NOTHING TO ASSIGN TO McKEAN IN 1985. 
A. Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire did not object to 
Child's claim that he owned the Traverse Mountain property under 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract nor did they object to being 
treated as secured creditors in Child's bankruptcy. 
McKean's assertion that Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire did not 
convey to Child their interests in the Alpine Contract seems difficult to understand. (McKean 
Brief, at 21-23.) On the one hand, McKean seems satisfied that the Bankruptcy Trustee sold 
one hundred percent of the Traverse Mountain Property (see defendants' opening Brief, at 21-
22), yet on the other he insists that "[i]n reality Child owned nothing more than his 
partnership interest in the contract." (McKean Brief, at 22.) According to McKean, the 
-10-
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Bankruptcy Court was able to sell all of the property because of its "strong arm powers," 
which McKean describes as "inherent." (McKean Brief, at 22, 23.) 
McKean does not attempt to describe the statutory basis on which the Bankruptcy 
Court exercised that kind of power to sell property that was not owned by the bankruptcy 
debtor and over which it had no control and to distribute the proceeds to Child's creditors. 
There is no statutory basis for the Bankruptcy Court to exercise "strong arm powers" of that 
sort. The Bankruptcy Court has no "inherent power" to take control of and sell property 
interests owned by persons other than the bankruptcy debtor.9 McKean cites absolutely no 
basis for this erroneous description of bankruptcy law. McKean's contention about the 
"inherent powers" of the bankruptcy court is a sheer invention, utterly unsupported by any 
statutory or case citation. 
In point of fact, the Bankruptcy Court's power to sell all of the Traverse Mountain 
property is well-documented in Myron Child's bankruptcy proceeding and, in particular, in his 
Third Amended Plan of Reorganization. When Child filed his Chapter 11 petition, he 
identified the Traverse Property—all of it-as one of his assets10 and he identified Cook, 
9
 Under 11 U.S.C. § 363(h), a bankruptcy trustee may sell the undivided interest of a co-
owner in property if certain conditions are met, such as the impracticability of partition in 
kind. In such an event, however, the co-owner is paid his share of the sale proceeds. Child's 
trustee did not sell the Traverse Mountain property under this section. Child's Plan clearly 
treats Child as the owner of all of the property and Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen as secured 
creditors. The proceeds of the sale were not divided among them as it would have been had 
the trustee's sale been made under Section 363(h). Alpine bought the property at the sale 
having credit-bid part of the amount it was owed by Child. See Trustee's Report Regarding 
Auction Sale, Exhibit D-48 (showing that there were no proceeds from the sale except those 
paid for administrative expenses). 
10
 A copy of Schedule B to Child's bankruptcy petition entitled "Statement of all Property 
of Debtor" was attached to defendants' opening Brief as Exhibit G. That schedule identified 
(continued...) 
-11-
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Lamoreaux, and Hansen as secured creditors, each holding a security interest in the Traverse 
Mountain property.11 From that point on, the Bankruptcy Court, Child, McKean,12 
Cook,13 Lamoreaux,14 and Hansen15 all considered that Child was the owner of all of the 
Traverse Mountain property. There were no dissenters among that group and no objections 
(...continued) 
the Traverse Mountain property ("Acreage, 4,400 acres located between Draper City and 
Alpine City in Salt Lake and Utah counties") with a market value of 536,000,000.00. The 
Schedule also attached a detailed legal description of the Traverse Mountain property, 
including the parcels that McKean had demanded be released, which are identified in Finding 
of Fact No. 16 (R. 675). Schedule B was admitted at the trial as Exhibit D-25. Child 
testified that he listed all of the Traverse Mountain property as his asset because he believed 
he had purchased it pursuant to the Uniform Real Estate Contract (Exhibit D-9) and the 
Assignment (Exhibit D-8). (Tr. Vol. I, at 336, 339.) 
11
 According to Schedule A-2 filed by Child with his bankruptcy petition (a copy of 
which is appended to defendants' opening Brief as Exhibit F), entitled "Creditors holding 
security," he owed each of Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen the sum of $500,000.00 plus 
interest. Child described the security for the debts owed to them as "4,400 acres purchased 
under Uniform Real Estate Contract dated September 19, 1980" with a market value of 
$36,000,000.00. Schedule A-2 was admitted at trial as Exhibit D-23. 
12
 McKean made no objection to Child's claim of ownership of Traverse Mountain. He 
testified, in fact, that would have expected to be paid had Child been successful in selling the 
property under his bankruptcy plan. (Tr. Vol. I, at 74.) 
13
 Cook testified he knew that Child claimed to own all of Traverse Mountain when he 
filed bankruptcy. (Tr. Vol. I, at 158.) 
14
 Lamoreaux testified that he knew that Child claimed to own all of Traverse Mountain 
in his bankruptcy proceeding and that he was treated as a secured creditor. (Tr. Vol. I, at 
193-94.) 
15
 Although Hansen did not testify at the trial because of medical reasons (Tr. Vol. I, at 
82), he voted for Child's Third Amended Plan of Reorganization, which provides that Child 
owned the entire property and which further provided that Hansen was a secured creditor. 
(Exhibit D-60; Tr. Vol. II, at 244-46).) 
-12-
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were filed. Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen all voted in favor of the Plan,16 under which they 
were treated as secured creditors.17 
The fact that the Uniform Real Estate Contract and the Assignment had been 
escrowed did not affect their validity in the minds of Cook and Lamoreaux, each of whom 
believed that the contract was valid and that Child was obligated to pay them the money that 
he owned. Cook testified that Child owed him $500,000 under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract regardless of whether it was recorded or not. (Tr. Vol. I, at 152.) Cook expected to 
be paid in the event that the property was sold out of Child's bankruptcy. (Tr. Vol. I, at 
159.) Lamoreaux also recognized the validity of the Uniform Real Estate Contract and 
admitted that he could have sued Child under that contract, but "chose to follow the plan [in 
bankruptcy] he gave us." (Tr. Vol. I, at 192.) According to Lamoreaux, the escrow was 
created so that Child would not have the right to the property until the money was paid. (Tr. 
Vol. I, at 193.)18 
Although Child was not entitled to receive title, he was nevertheless obligated to 
make the payments under the executory installment land contract. He fails to explain how the 
trial court's conclusion that the Uniform Real Estate Contract was nothing more than an 
unenforced "option" when both Cook and Lamoreaux believed it to constitute a valid and 
16
 (Exhibit D-60; Tr. Vol. I, at 213-14, Vol. II, at 244-46.) 
17
 Under the Plan, Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen were Class 8 secured creditors, having a 
priority No. 2. (Exhibit D-32, at 39.) 
18
 That is precisely what the Uniform Real Estate Contract provided. According to 
paragraph 19 of the Contract, Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire, as the Sellers, 
would not be required to give Child a warranty deed conveying title to the property until after 
the payments had been received. (Exhibit D-9.) 
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binding obligation of Child's. Indeed, under the plain and unambiguous language of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract the transaction constitutes a sale of real property and not merely 
the creation of an "option."19 
The trial court's conclusion in the present case that Child's interest in the property 
"did not include the interests of other partners of New Empire" (Conclusion No. 5; R. 682) 
was simply unfounded and is erroneous as a matter of law.20 The Uniform Real Estate 
Contract was entirely effective to convey the New Empire Group's interest under the Alpine 
Contract to Child and was so treated by the Bankruptcy Court, Child, and all of Child's 
creditors including Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen. 
19
 The Uniform Real Estate Contract describes the transaction as follows: "the Seller 
[identified as New Empire Development Corporation, Hansen, Cook, and Lamoreaux], for the 
consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, and the buyer for the 
consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property . . . ." 
(Uniform Real Estate Contract f 2.) On its fact, the Contract does not create an "option" in 
Child, but a binding sale of real property interests. 
20
 At the trial, the lower court acknowledged that Child's trustee "sold all the property, all 
of it." The court noted further that Child got the Traverse Mountain property "pursuant to the 
Contract" and that the Bankruptcy Court "deemed he owned the property and sold it." (Tr. 
Vol. II, at 310-11.) The trial court acknowledged that "the bankruptcy court determined that 
he [Child] owned all of it [Traverse Mountain] and sold all of it and whoever bought it 
bought it—all of the interest." (Tr. Vol. II, at 301-02.) The court asked McKean's counsel 
"That's not an issue now, that they only sold a quarter of an interest, is it?" To which 
McKean's attorney replied, "No." (Tr. Vol II, at 302.) In its Memorandum Decision, rather 
than finding that the Uniform Real Estate Contract was an unexercised "option," the trial court 
found that it "had the appearance of validity" but was an "exercise in futility." Without 
explaining the legal basis for its ruling, the trial court held that defendants' "reliance upon the 
particular Uniform Real Estate Contract to defeat plaintiffs claim as an assignee is not well-
founded." (Memorandum Decision, at 8; R. 586.) The conclusions of latw were, in fact, not 
prepared by the trial court, but by counsel for McKean. The trial court signed them without 
attempting to reconcile them with the Memorandum Decision. 
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B. Child's Plan of Reorganization, which Cook, Lamoreaux, and 
Hansen voted for, specifically provided that they had conveyed 
their interest in Traverse Mountain to Child. 
During his bankruptcy proceeding, Child exercised control and ownership over 
Traverse Mountain without objection from any of the New Empire Group. As stated in 
defendants' opening Brief, Child's Third Amended Plan of Reorganization explains in clear 
terms how it was that Child owned the Traverse Mountain property. (Defendants' Opening 
Brief, at 17-18.)21 In his brief, McKean ignored the provision in Child's Plan that 
specifically provided that Child owned all of Traverse Mountain. The Bankruptcy Court's 
confirmation of the Plan had the effect of finding and ordering that Child owned all of the 
Traverse Mountain property under the Alpine Contract. In the Plan, the "Traverse Mountain 
Property Interest" was defined as: 
any and all right, title and interest of Debtor [Child] in and to all or 
any portion of the Traverse Mountain Property, including, without 
limitation, any such right, title and interest in and to all or any portion 
of such property as Debtor may have pursuant to the Alpine Contract. 
(Exhibit D-32, at 8; emphasis added.) 
The Plan defined the "Alpine Contract" as "a certain Real Estate Sales Agreement 
dated June 1, 1978, by and between Michael W. McBride as 'Seller' and Ronald S. Cook, 
Myron B. Child, Jr., Ray W. Lamoreaux, Wendell P. Hansen and New Empire Development 
Co. collectively as 'Buyers.'" (Exhibit D-32, at 4.) In order to make clear that Child owned 
all of the buyers' interest under the Alpine Contract, the Plan specifically recited that the 
Alpine Contract 
21
 The Bankruptcy Court specifically ordered that the trustee be appointed pursuant to 
Article XVI of the Plan. (Exhibit D-42.) From that point, the Trustee owned all of Child's 
interest in Traverse Mountain. 
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was assigned by Ronald S. Cook, Ray W. Lamoreaux, Wendell P. 
Hansen and New Empire Development Co. to Myron B. Child. Jr. by 
an unrecorded Real Estate Contract dated September, 1980. 
(Exhibit D-32, at 4, under definition of "Alpine Contract.")22 
Except to argue that the Plan was ineffective, McKean utterly ignores the 
significance of this provision in his brief. He does not address these crucial provisions of the 
Plan, under which Child was the owner of all of the Traverse Mountain property. McKean 
fails to explain why, if the Uniform Real Estate Contract were nothing more than an 
unexercised "option," Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen each voted for the Plan. 
In his brief, McKean claims that the "bankruptcy court never addressed the issue of 
what portion of the property belonged to Mr. Child vs. other interested parties." (McKean 
Brief at 23.) That statement reflect's McKean's total ignorance of the Plan, which 
specifically provided that Child owned all of the buyers' interest under the Alpine Contract, 
which had been assigned to him by Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire. 
C. Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire sold their interest in 
the Alpine Contract under the doctrine of equitable conversion. 
In his brief, McKean argues that the doctrine of equitable conversion does not 
apply "because there was never a transfer of property to Child." (McKean Brief, at 23.) The 
22
 Under the terms of Article V of the Plan, Child was granted "an exclusive right" to sell 
on behalf of his bankruptcy estate "the Traverse Mountain Property Interest free and clear of 
all liens and encumbrances." It was pursuant to that provision that Child attempted to sell the 
Traverse Mountain property during his bankruptcy. That effort having failed without an 
"Acceptable Sale," as that term was defined in Article I of the Plan, the Bankruptcy Court 
ordered the appointment of a trustee to liquidate the Estate under Article XVI of the Plan. 
The Trustee held the same title to the Traverse Mountain property as had Child. When she 
sold the property at the auction, she sold all of the buyers' interest under the Alpine Contract. 
New Empire, Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen were left with no interest in that contract. When 
they made their assignment to McKean in June, 1985, they had nothing left to assign. 
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authorities cited in defendants' opening Brief are "distinguishable," he claims, "because they 
are cases in which the buyer had the use of the land and possession of the contract 
documents." (McKean Brief, at 22.) McKean cites no case for this erroneous statement. One 
searches the authorities cited in defendants' opening Brief in vain for a rule requiring actual 
possession of real property and of the contract documents in order for the transfer of equitable 
title to occur. The rule of Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1254 (Utah 1987), applies 
regardless of whether the vendee has actual possession of the property. That rule was 
affirmed by the Supreme Court in Cannefax v. Clement 818 P.2d 546, 547-49 (Utah 1991) 
(holding that a vendee's interest in property under a uniform real estate contract is an interest 
in real property under the doctrine of equitable estoppel).23 
Moreover, there is no factual basis for McKean's assertion that Child did not have 
possession of the Traverse Mountain property. The trial court made no such finding. The 
only evidence presented at trial suggests that Child did have possession of the property after 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract was signed. According to paragraph 3 of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract, "[possession of said premises [the Traverse Mountain property] shall be 
delivered to buyer [Child] on the 20 day of September, 1980." In addition, Child attempted 
to sell the property while he was in bankruptcy, as authorized by his Plan of 
Reorganization.24 He must have been in possession of the property in order to try to sell it. 
23
 In its discussion of equitable estoppel, the Supreme Court in Cannefax makes no 
mention of any requirement that the vendee have possession of the property. 
24
 According to Article V of the Plan, Child was granted the "exclusive right to sell on 
behalf of the Estate pursuant to an Acceptable Sale [a defined term] the Traverse Mountain 
Property Interest [a defined term] free and clear of all liens and encumbrances of title for a 
period commencing on the Confirmation Date and expiring on July 25, 1984.) (Exhibit D-32, 
(continued...) 
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There is no evidence that he was not in possession. Thus, even if McKean's understanding of 
the doctrine of equitable conversion is correct, Child's possession of the land was sufficient to 
cause equitable title to pass to Child. (McKean Brief, at 22.) 
IV. 
THE FAILURE OF THE PLAN DID NOT RESTORE ANY RIGHTS TO 
SUE DEFENDANTS UNDER THE ALPINE CONTRACT. 
In arguing that the Plan became null and void when Child was unable to sell the 
Traverse Mountain Property within the time specified, McKean quotes a provision from 
Article XVI of the Plan. (McKean Brief, at 28.) He only quotes half of the sentence, 
however, omitting the most crucial language of the provision. The omitted portion flatly 
contradicts his assertion that the failure of the Plan restored to Child his claims against 
defendants for failure to release property under paragraph 2.6 of the Alpine Contract. The 
full provision is quoted below. The portion omitted in McKean's brief is underscored: 
Notwithstanding the occurrence of the Effective Date, if for any reason 
whatsoever and regardless of fault, the Approved Sale has not occurred 
on or before July 25, 1984, the Plan and all acceptances of the Plan and 
assumptions pursuant to the Plan shall be void and of no force or effect 
(except that the matters approved in Article IV, the Super Priority 
Loan(s) pursuant to Article III and the disposition of the Canterbury 
Property pursuant to Article VII(A) shall be unaffected, and Debtor 
shall automatically forfeit any right Debtor might otherwise have to 
require the conveyance to or for the benefit of Debtor of acreage 
pursuant to the partial release provision of paragraph 2.6 of the Alpine 
Contract) . . . . 
(Exhibit D-32, at 28; emphasis added.) 
(...continued) 
at 13.) He made substantial efforts to sell the property pursuant to the Plan (Tr. Vol. II, at 
343), and even attempted to sell the property before the Plan was confirmed (Tr. Vol. II, at 
342-343; Exhibit D-27). 
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Under this provision, if the Plan fails, it is "of no force or effect" except that Child 
shall "automatically forfeit" any right that he might otherwise have to require the conveyance 
of acreage "pursuant to the partial release provision of paragraph 2.6 of the Alpine Contract," 
which is the exact paragraph under which McKean is suing. (Complaint, f 11; R. 3.) 
Defendants quoted this language in their opening Brief (Defendants' Brief at 25), and yet 
McKean completely failed to address its significance in his brief. Instead, he deleted that 
language in his brief, inserting an ellipsis in its place. Under that provision, the failure of the 
Plan creates a complete bar to any right under the Alpine Contract to receive partial 
conveyances of property. 
V. 
THE POST-CONFIRMATION DISMISSAL OF CHILD'S 
BANKRUPTCY DID NOT AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF 
THE PLAN OF REORGANIZATION. 
McKean asserts that the dismissal of Child's bankruptcy in February, 1988, 
somehow invalidates all of the provisions of the Plan. (McKean Brief, at 24.) This is not so. 
Section 349 of the Bankruptcy Code delineates the effect of a dismissal in detail, referring to 
specific transactions and sections of the Bankruptcy Code that are affected by a dismissal. 
Section 349 does not provide that a plan confirmed under Section 1129 is somehow undone, 
set aside, or invalidated. Bankruptcy courts have thus held that a subsequent dismissal does 
not affect a confirmed plan. 
In his brief, McKean cites only general provisions that the "basic purpose" of 
Section 349 of the Bankruptcy Code is to "undo" the bankruptcy case "as far as practicable." 
He cites no authority, however, that the dismissal of a bankruptcy case would "undo" the 
provisions of a confirmed plan. McKean ignores the case of Matter of Depew, 115 B.R. 965 
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(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989), cited by defendants (Defendants' Brief, at 34-35), which held that 
the post-confirmation dismissal of the Chapter 11 case "does not affect the finality of the 
confirmation order or the discharge that goes with it. . . . Both are effective 'without regard to 
whether the debtor pays according to the plan or not.' . . . " Id. at 967 (citations omitted).25 
The sections referred to in Section 349 do not include Seclion 1129 (which 
governs confirmation of plans), Section 1141 (which provides that a plan is binding on a 
debtor and his creditors), Section 1104 (governing the appointment of a trustee), Section 1106 
(governing the duties of a trustee), Section 363(b) (governing sales of property by a trustee), 
or Section 521 (governing the debtor's duties when a trustee is serving in a case). All of 
these sections had an effect on Child's bankruptcy case and on the sale of the Traverse 
Mountain property. 
Even if the dismissal somehow revested Child with claims against Alpine, it is 
undisputed that, at the time Child made the assignment to McKean in June of 1985, Child was 
still in bankruptcy and had a trustee appointed. The subsequent dismissal (which occurred 
after this case was commenced) did not somehow vest McKean with claim against Alpine. 
The dismissal of Child's bankruptcy case did not affect the validity of the Plan. 
Under the bankruptcy rules cited in defendants' opening Brief, that Plan is res judicata as to 
25
 The Depew court concluded that the dismissal of the Chapter 11 case after confirmation 
did not affect the plan in any way. To construe an order of dismissal as vacating a confirmed 
plan "would severely undermine the effect that Congress gave to confirmation of a plan and 
the need to give finality to the act of confirmation." Id. at 972. 
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all claims that were or could have been made against Child in his bankruptcy proceeding.26 
McKean's assertion that "by no stretch of the imagination can one claim that McKean's claim 
against Alpine was competently, fully, or fairly litigated" (McKean Brief, at 30) ignores the 
fact that the Plan represented a compromise between Child and his creditors, including Cook, 
Lamoreaux, Hansen, McKean, and Alpine.27 Whether they agreed with the Plan or not, it 
was confirmed by an Order of the Bankruptcy Court. Being confirmed, the Plan constituted a 
new contract between the parties. The Plan's provision that claims for breach of paragraph 
2.6 of the Alpine Contract are forfeited is res judicata and survives both the failure of the 
Plan and the dismissal of the bankruptcy case. 
VI. 
McKEAN'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
In arguing that the claims against defendants for breach of the Alpine Contract 
were tolled by Child's bankruptcy filing, McKean misunderstands the effect of 11 U.S.C. § 
362. That section does not bar claims against any persons who are not in bankruptcy. 
26
 McKean's attempt to distinguish Southmark Properties v. Charles House Corporation, 
742 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1984), cited in defendants' opening Brief, focuses on meaningless 
differences while ignoring the central holding of the case. Under Southmark, a party to a 
confirmed plan cannot "undo a judicial decree which they had a full opportunity to contest, 
and chose not to." 742 F.2d at 872. Under that rule, none of Child's creditors-including 
Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, New Empire, and McKean—can attack the provisions of the Plan 
or the sale of the property by Child's trustee. They cannot alter, at this late date, the 
provision of Article XVI that Child forfeited his right to receive a partial reconveyance of the 
property. 
27
 According to the Disclosure Statement filed in Child's bankruptcy case, the Plan's 
treatment of the secured claims of Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen "including its discount and 
classification" represented a "compromise" between the parties that they considered "to be in 
their respective best interest." (Disclosure Statement, f 3, at 24; Exhibit 62-D; Tr. Vol. I, at 
248-49.) 
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Child's bankruptcy filing meant only that his creditors-including McKean-could not sue him. 
It did not bar any claims against Alpine by Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hamsen. Nor did it bar 
any claims that McKean may have had personally. 
The trial court's conclusion that claims against defendants were tolled because 
their "ability to convey land was stayed by the bankruptcy proceedings of Myron Child" is 
simply erroneous. (Conclusion No. 8; R. 683.) If McKean (or his assignors) could sue for a 
return of the money in 1985, they could have sued for a return of the money in 1979 when 
the money was paid and the land not received. McKean erroneously assumes that he had to 
wait until he could no longer sue for specific performance before he could sue for return of 
the 1979 payment. (McKean Brief, at 32.) There is no rule of law, and McKean cites none, 
that requires exhaustion of remedies for specific performance before a plaintiff can sue for 
legal damages. Myron Child's bankruptcy did not prevent McKean in any way from going to 
court and suing these defendants to get his money back. 
The four year statute of limitations applies. Like the written contracts in Brown v. 
Cleverly. 93 Utah 54, 70 P.2d 881 (1937), and Duncan v. Gisborn. 17 Utah 209, 53 P. 1044 
(1898), the Alpine Contract, on which McKean is suing, contains no provision requiring the 
return of money paid if no land is conveyed. Any claim to a return of the money is thus "the 
implied promise of defendants to return the purchase money." Brown v. Cleverly, 70 P.2d at 
885. A claim for breach of that implied promise is governed by the four year statute of 
limitations. That period of limitation began to run on the day that the lemd should have been 
released. The trial court found that McKean claimed the land should have been released on 
June 25, 1979, and, moreover, that the buyers sent a Notice of Default to McBride and Alpine 
088X44336 1 
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on July 3, 1980. (Finding of Fact Nos. 16, 17; R. 675.) Using either date, the action was not 
filed within four years and is time-barred. 
VII. 
McKEAN'S CLAIMS ARE SUBJECT TO A SET-OFF. 
Even if the buyers under the Alpine Contract had no obligation to make further 
payments after Alpine failed to make a partial release of land in 1979, when Child filed 
bankruptcy he claimed ownership of the entire Traverse Mountain property, not only the 
portion that should have been released. In the bankruptcy proceeding it was determined that 
Alpine had a lien on the property in the approximate amount of $4,437,683.93. (Child's 
Disclosure Statement, Exhibit D-62.)28 In arguing that there was no right of set-off, 
McKean again ignores the effect of Child's bankruptcy. According to his confirmed Plan of 
Reorganization, Child was the owner of the property and owed Alpine an amount equal to the 
present value of the Alpine Contract with interest. (See Third Amended Plan of 
Reorganization, Articles I(c)(i) and VI(A)).29 
When McKean was given the assignment of claims against Alpine, he took the 
assignment subject to a set-off for the unpaid balance due under the Alpine Contract. Child 
owned the entire property which was disposed of by the bankruptcy auction without payment 
to Alpine. Alpine credit-bid $2,000,000.00 at the sale, which was less than half the amount it 
In his bankruptcy schedules, Child stated that he owed Alpine the total amount of 
$6,450,000.00. (Exhibit D-23, at 2.) 
29
 According the Article VI(a), Alpine (a Class 4 Claimant) was to be paid first in priority 
over all other creditors. 
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was due.30 The remaining balance was still owed to Alpine when McKean received his 
assignment. Under the legal authorities cited in defendants' opening Brief, defendants were 
entitled to set off the sums owed to them by McKean's assignors against any amount that may 
have been owed to the assignors. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment should be reversed. McKean has no claim in his own right and 
received none by the assignment from the New Empire Group. Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, 
and New Empire had no claims to assign, having previously sold their interest in the Alpine 
Contract to Myron Child. Child had no claims to assign while he was in bankruptcy. His 
Plan of Reorganization specifically provided that, even if the plan failed, Child would have no 
right to receive any releases of property under paragraph 2.6 of the Alpine Contract. That 
provision by itself is conclusive of this litigation. It is res judicata. The lower court erred in 
holding that the claims of the New Empire Group, including Child, survived the bankruptcy 
proceeding. McKean's claims were also time-barred, not having been brought within four 
years after he paid the money on behalf of New Empire. 
DATED this \ j day of November, 1993. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Attorneys for defendants/appellants 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
See the Trustee's Report Regarding Auction Sale, Exhibit D-48. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the within 
and foregoing Appellants' Brief to be mailed, postage prepaid, this ! ' day of November, 
1993, to the following: 
Ralph R. Tate, Jr. 
Attorneys for plaintiff 
4685 Highland Drive, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
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ADDENDUM 
The Agreement and Assignment between defendants and Delaware Funding & 
Guaranty dated January 8, 1993, is appended to this Reply Brief. 
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AGflJfPMFNT AND ASSIGNMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this _# day of 
Jidfijiiafc 199_J between Delaware Funding & Guaranty, a 
D/laware'corporation ("Delaware ), and Micheal W. Mcfiride, 
Alpine Ltd,, a Utah limited partnership, Geodyne II, a Utah 
general partnership, Dan C. Simons, and 
Arden J. Bodell ("Alpine"). 
RECITALS; 
Whereas, Alpine is a limited partner in TR INVESTMENTS 
LTD., a Utah limited partnership ("TR") the 9ole asset of 
which is a parcel of real property in Salt Lake/Utah 
counties often referred to as Traverse B-Wge ("Traverse"); 
and, 
Whereas, FMA Thrift and Loan Company ("FMA") commenced 
an action in the First Judicial District Court for Box Elder 
County, State of Utah entitled FMA Thrift and Loan Company, 
now known a a Moore Financial Company of Utah vc. Alpftft, 
Leasing Company, a Utah general partnership consisting of 
Dorius g. Black. Joseph Cannon. McKean Equipment Company. 
Inc.. McKean Construction Company. Inc.. Gritton and 
Associates, Richard J. McKean. Robert P. Apgood. and Rex J. 
Black, et al.. Civil No 17754 (the "FMA Action"); and, 
Whereas, FMA obtained a judgment in the FMA Action on 
July 19, 1984, in the principal amount of ¥855,553.25, 
together with interest, costs, and attorneys' fees (the "FMA 
Judgment); and, 
Whereas, West One Bank <"West One") became the 
successor in interest to FMA and thereby became the owner of 
all claims against defendants in the FMA Action and of the 
FMA Judgment; and, 
Whereas, Richard J. McKean ("McKean) commenced an 
action against Alpine Ltd., Geodyne II, Dan C.Simons, and 
Arden J. Bodell in an action commenced in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah entitled 
Richard F. McKean vs. Hicheal W. McBride. Alpine Ltd,, and 
Fidelity National Title Insurance Company, Geodyne II. a 
Utah general Bartntrahlp. Dan C. Simons, and Arden J. 
Bodell, civii* C85-4003 in (the "McKean Action"). McKean 
obtained a judgment in the McKean Action (the"McKean 
Judgment") against Alpine, Geodyne II, Simons, Bodell, and 
McBride; and, 
Pase-2 
Whereas, McKean s lawyer m the McKean Action, Ralph R. 
Tate. Jr., <"Tate") has claimed and filed an Amended Notice 
of Lien for attorney * fees pursuant to Utan Code Ann. 73-
51-41, dated April 15, 1992, by which Tate claims a lien on 
the McKean Judgment in the sum of 3b percent of the McKsan 
Judgment together with actual costs incurred. Tate alleges 
in his Amended Notice of Lien that costs are estimated to be 
$3,000 as of April 15, 1992; and
 T 
Whereas, West One and Delaware entered into an 
agreement by which West One assigned to Delaware 
approximately $300,COO worth of the FMA Judgment, including 
the right to execute on assets of any of the Judgment 
debtors under the FMA Judgment; and, 
Whereas, Pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the 
Court in the FMA Action, the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, conducted a public auction at whichr-all of 
WcKean's claims and judgments against Alpine, Geodyne II, 
Simons, and Bodell were sold. Delaware purchased such 
assets at the sale and is now the sole owner of the McKean 
Judgment; and, 
Whereas, Alpine denies liability to McKean and has 
appealed from the McKean Judgment to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The appeal is pending; and, 
The parties hereto, then wish to settle all claims against 
each other and to satisfy the McKean Judgment. 
AGREEMENT AND ASSIGNMENT: 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual 
covenants and obligations contained herein, and in further 
consideration of Alpine's assignment to Delaware of the 
first $10,000 received fro© the sale of any portion of 
Traverse, the parties do hereby agree as follows: 
1. Alpine hereby assigns to Delaware the first $10,000 
due Alpine from the sale of any portion of Traverse or from 
the sale of any portion of the Alpine's interest in TR. 
Furthermore, Alpine hereby instructs TR to pay directly to 
Delaware said funds on behalf of Alpine. 
2. In consideration of the assignment by Alpine, as set 
forth above, Delaware for itself, its assigns, legal 
representatives, or anyone claimin£ byt through, or under 
it, hereby releases and forever discharges Alpine 
Ltd.,,Geodyne II, Dan C. Simons, Arden J. Bodell, and 
Micheal W. McBride, and their successors, assigns, insurers, 
and attorneys, and each of them, from any and all claims, 
indebtedness, causea of action, damages, costs, that in any 
way arise out of, are connected with, or relate to: (i) the 
McKean Action; (ii) the McKean Judgment; (ill) any and all 
Page-3 
claims that have bee::, aiignt have been, or may in the future 
be asserted by McKean or t>y Delaware? in tne McKean Action or 
in any future action or proceeding based upon tne events, 
transaction or other factual matters alleged ir. the McKean 
Action including, without limitation, all claims for 
damages, contribution, indemnification, and other forms of 
relief, whether at law or in equity. 
3. Delaware agrees to deliver to Alpine a satisfaction 
of the McKean Judgment for filing with the court in the 
McKean Action. 
4. In the event that it is determined that Tate bas a 
valid attorney's lien, Delaware shall pay to Tate a sum 
equal to 35 percent of the amount received by Delaware from 
TB at such time as Delaware shall receive any such amounts 
from TP. In the event that it is deterrai-ned that Tate's 
alleged attorney's lien included costs incurred in the 
McKean Action, Delaware shall also pay Tate such costs as he 
is entitled to under the McKean Judgment. Delaware's 
obligation to pay Tate is contingent on a determination that 
he has a valid and enforceable Lien on the McKean Judgment 
and limited to the funds actually received from TJR. 
5. Alpine's assignment of the first $10,000.00 of the 
proceeds from the sale of Traverse, as set forth above, is a 
compromise of disputed claim and is not to be construed as 
an admission of liability by Alpine. 
6. The parties do not intend that the appeal of the 
McKean Judgment, presently pending in the Utah Court of 
Appeals, should be dismissed or otherwise affected by the 
execution of this Agreement and Assignment or the carrying 
out of its terms including the filing of the satisfaction of 
the McKean Judgment. The parties agree that the appeal 
shall be prosecuted until a final disposition is reached. 
In the event that the McKean Judgment Is reversed or 
overturned, Delaware ahall, within thirty (30) days repay 
any and all consideration that it may have previously 
received from Alpine, Geodyne II, Simons, or Bodeli pursuant 
to this Agreement and Assignment. 
7. Delaware warrants and represents that their has been 
no assignment of any of the claims being released hereby and 
that its execution of this Agreement and Assignment 
constitutes a full and complete release and discharge of 
those claims. 
8. This Agreement and Assignment shall be binding on 
the parties' heirs, successors, and assigns. 
9. This Agreement and Assignment shall be construed and 
enforced according to the laws of the State of Utah. 
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10. In the event of any claim, action, cr lawsuit to 
enforce, modify, interpret, invalidate, rescind, or set 
aside any term or provision of this Agreement and 
Assignment, whether with or without suit, the prevailing 
party shall be entitled to an award of its costs and 
expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, incurred as 
a result of such claim, action, cr lawsuit. 
11. This Agreement and Assignment represents the entire 
agreement between the parties with respect zo the subject 
matter hereof, and supersedes all prior agreements, 
contracts, or negotiations, which are of no further force or 
effect. This Agreement and Assignment may not be amended or 
modified except in writing executed by both of the parties 
hereto. 
12.. If any provisions of this Agreement and Assignment 
as applied to any party or to any circumstance shall be 
adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction to be void or 
unenforceable for any reason, the same shall in no way 
affect Cto the maximum extent permitted oy applicable law) 
any other provision of this Agreement and Assignment, the 
application of any such provision under circumstances 
different from those adjudicated by the court, or the 
validity or enforceability of this Agreement and Assignment. 
IN WITNESS WHESSOF, the parties hereto have caused their 
names to me signed hereunder. 
Alpine Ltd., a Utah Limited Partnership, 
by Geodyne II, a Utah General Partnership, 
Dan C. Simoril 
Xrden^/. Bode 11 
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Delaware Funding & Guaranty, a Delaware Corporation, 
by \ ^ ^ " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ V ~ Secretary 
Sal^ A. TayJ^f 
Acknowledgment 
TB Investments Ltd. hereby: 
Acknowledges receipt of a copy of tne above AGBE2HENT 
AND ASSIGNMENT. 
Confirms that Alpine Ltd. ia a limited partner in TB-
States that TB acknowledges no claims superior to the 
above assignment. 
Promised to abide as instructed in said AGREEMENT AND 
ASSIGNMENT. 
IN WITNESS WHEBE0F, the parties hereto have caused tiieir 
name to me signed hereunder. 
TR Investments Ltd., a Utah Limited Partnership, 
by: 
Franklin Financial, a Utah Corporation, General Partner 
. President 
by Geodyne II, a Utah General Partnership, 
bv Partner 
Michel W. MeBride * 
<*£&2D<g±&& v? Partner 
Irden J . ^ o d e l l v -
,, Partner 
A  
